

# Research on the war between Russia and Ukraine and its impact on the Russian economy and tourism.

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## Abstract.

The study has revealed positive dynamics related to domestic tourism flows. Furthermore, the study analysed changes in the number of tourists visiting the Russian Federation. The present study focused on the analysis of regional and political conflicts in the context of Ukraine-Russia relations. The objective of the present study is twofold: firstly, to ascertain the historical causes of the war for both countries; and secondly, to examine the economies and tourism of both countries during the war period. The study has revealed positive dynamics related to domestic tourism flows. Furthermore, the study has analysed changes in the number of tourists visiting the Russian Federation.

A comprehensive analysis of research materials, encompassing news, commentary, and war analysis, significant media reports that exerted a substantial influence on public opinion, official documents published by governments and international organisations, and information obtained from key individuals, has been undertaken to elucidate the legal and political dimensions of the war.

The conclusion section provides a comprehensive overview of the concept of 'peace' and the importance of UN Peace Day. The objective of the present analysis, as articulated in the primary conclusions of the article, is to elucidate the significance of these concepts. For instance, the human cost of war, the economic devastation it engenders, and the resulting regional instability have not been considered in the efforts of both countries to achieve lasting peace.

**Keywords.** Russia-Ukraine war, tourism, accommodation facilities, Russian Federation political relations.

## Introduction.

A substantial corpus of literature has been dedicated to the geopolitical and military-strategic origins of the Ukraine conflict. However, neither in the media nor in the research literature there is hardly any clear view on the ethnic component. It is a widely acknowledged fact that Ukrainians and Russians share a close kinship. The subsequent analysis will examine the situation by considering the role of external forces in the rise to power of the Ukrainian elite, who pursued openly Russophobic policies.

The analysis will also consider the response of the Ukrainian masses to these policies, and whether they accepted and supported them. It is evident that there is a reluctance to engage in discourse regarding the internal preconditions of the conflict, deeming them to be of negligible significance. Consequently, the present article will seek to address these issues by examining the perspectives and responsibilities of businesses in this regard, as well as the detrimental impact on nature from economic and business perspectives.

The impact of war on tourism and vice versa has been extensively documented. War has been shown to have a detrimental effect on all sectors; the influx of tourists to a particular country is one of the first areas to be affected. Fear of war is one of the main factors leading to a decline in tourism, with people being discouraged from visiting Russia for sightseeing because of the threat of war. It is important to note that the discussion of tourism in the context of war is a fallacious one, as war is not a tourist destination.

A multitude of significant factors have influenced the development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its escalation into a war. The predominant factor was the escalation in Ukraine's gas debt towards Russia. Subsequent to this, the Ukrainian government underwent a transition, and thirdly, a referendum on the status of Crimea was held in 2014. (Metlenko E.A., The 'Gas' Conflict between Russia and Ukraine: The Experience of Settlement in 1992-1999. / Scientific Bulletin of Belgorod State University, History. Political science. Economics. Informatics, issue 19 (138) /volume24/2012.)

The outbreak and escalation of the war had a direct and devastating impact on the tourism sector. The imposition of travel restrictions, the emergence of security concerns and the presence of economic uncertainties have collectively resulted in a significant disruption to international tourism to both Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, geopolitical tensions in the region have the potential to exert a negative influence on the tourism industry in neighbouring countries.

In such conflict environments, businesses are confronted with a dual responsibility, both ethical and financial, in their dealings with such regions. The uncertainty engendered by the war, supply chain disruptions and market changes has precipitated the cessation of operations or modification of strategies on the part of many businesses.

The tourism sector has been particularly adversely affected by the crises. The war has had a detrimental effect on the hotel industry, travel agencies, restaurants and related businesses, as it has resulted in a decline in tourism. This has resulted in a loss of employment and a reduction in income at the local level. Moreover, the deleterious impact of the war on the image may impede the recovery of tourism in the long term, even in the event of a cessation of hostilities. Consequently, businesses are obliged to act in a manner that considers not only their own interests but also the impact on society in the face of conflict. This responsibility should be evaluated within the framework of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility).

The two objectives of this study are twofold: first, to analyse the characteristics of conflict; second, to highlight threats to the intensity of relations and increase their potential. The following is a list of the study's objectives. The objectives of the present study are as follows:

1. To study the history of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and to analyse the foreign trade relations between these countries.
2. Analysing SWOT and socio-economic indicators of relations.
3. To examine the Russian-Ukrainian war and the responsibility of businesses on this issue and to analyse the side effects of the war on tourism.

**1. To study the history of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and to analyse the foreign trade relations between these countries.**

The present study analyses the regional and political conflicts of Ukraine-Russia relations, with a particular emphasis on the period preceding the events in Kiev. The analysis examines the evolution of tensions between the two nations, with a particular emphasis on the discourse surrounding the 'gas' issue, which has been a contentious subject in the bilateral relationship since 1993. The study also delves into the socio-political dynamics that led to the 'Orange Revolution' in 2004, a pivotal event that signalled the pro-European orientation of Ukrainian foreign policy. Subsequent measures were implemented to resolve these conflicts, however, Russia's rating underwent a precipitous decline. In light of this, European countries, cognisant of their reliance on Russian gas, are prioritising the evaluation of measures to reduce this reliance.

Therefore, the European inclination to support the Ukrainian government's anti-Russian sentiments is a rational response to the prevailing circumstances.

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Metlenko, E. A. (2012). The present paper sets out to explore the "Gas" conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the experience of settlement in 1992-1999. Scientific Bulletins of Belgorod State University, History. Political Science. Economics. Informatics, Issue 19 (138) / Volume 24.

The present study sets out to explore the hypothesis that the genesis of contemporary conflicts can be traced back to the political crisis in Ukraine in 2013. This crisis was triggered by the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend the process of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. This decision was met with opposition protests in Kiev, also known as 'Euromaidan'.

Following considerable pressure from Western countries, on 21 February, the then President Viktor Yanukovich signed an agreement with the protesters, which included the immediate restoration of the parliamentary-presidential form of government, the creation of a 'government of national trust', and the holding of early presidential elections. However, the very next day, Yanukovich was removed from office and the president's duties were taken over by Alexander Turchynov. The newly formed government was recognised by the European Union and the United States, but the Russian leadership perceived this extremely negatively and refused to consider it as an equal participant in the foreign policy dialogue (Brzezinski Z. The choice: world domination or global leadership. - 2006).

In an effort to resolve the ongoing conflict and thus re-establish the legitimacy of the government, the Russian government made an appeal to Western countries for assistance in establishing a government of national unity and in organising elections in accordance with the original plan. The disruption within the state administration resulted in protests in the south-eastern region of Ukraine, where the population has the closest ties with the Russian Federation and expresses a desire to maintain such close ties. These protests, which began as simple demonstrations, soon escalated into armed conflict, thereby creating a situation in which the country was being torn apart by separatist sentiments.

The victory of Russia was unconditional, and as such, it was not unexpected that the leaders of the United States and the European Union reacted negatively, labelling the people's militias 'separatists' and even 'terrorists'. The current leadership in Kiev also took this view and was constantly sending special forces to the southeast. Unfortunately, these actions did not help to resolve the current situation, which is why the army was forced to engage in punitive operations. It is evident that the people's militia has not yet been suppressed, as evidenced by the ongoing existence of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic, who continue to defend themselves. The escalation of hostilities has persisted in conjunction with the Crimean crisis. The Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic in Ukraine, along with Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, have declined to acknowledge the legitimacy of the newly established government and have sought Russian assistance. A referendum was subsequently held in Crimea, the results of which led to its incorporation into the Russian Federation. In response to the aforementioned annexation, Ukraine adopted the law 'On ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine' on 15 April 2014. According to this law, Crimea is considered a temporarily occupied territory and, at the same time, an integral part of Ukraine, subject to the Constitution and laws of the country. The actions of the Russian government have been widely criticised as armed aggression, both domestically and internationally, and the legality of the annexation of Crimea remains a subject of ongoing debate. In response to these actions, Ukraine has imposed numerous sanctions on Russia, including a decision to cease cooperation on the construction of the third and fourth units of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant. Additionally, the entry of Russian citizens into Ukrainian territory has been restricted. The resolution of this conflict remains unclear, although it is evident that the actions that have transpired, which were initially pursued as a peaceful endeavour to advance pro-European integration, have resulted in the eruption of civil war and the division of Ukraine. (Brzezinski Z. The Choice: World Domination or Global Leadership - 2006)

In order to comprehend the present situation in Ukraine, it is necessary to examine the events that transpired in the early twentieth century. The Russian Empire was a political structure characterised by feudalism, with the presence of rapidly developing capitalist relations and a population of diverse ethnic groups. The primary constituents of the empire were the Great Russian people, whose elite held significant positions in the political, economic and social spheres. The Great Russian people played a pivotal role in the formation of the Russian

nation, a social structure analogous to the system of large machines in material production (capitalism). The Great Russian elite cultivated appealing secular spiritual values that were disseminated through advanced social institutions such as schools, universities, theatres, museums, galleries, libraries, philharmonic societies, book publishing houses, newspaper publishing houses and magazines. These spiritual values were voluntarily adopted and assimilated by a diverse array of ethnic groups, including Little Russians, Belarusians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Georgians, and Jews, among others. The project of building the Russian nation was realised within a framework that guaranteed equal rights for all ethnic groups in terms of social development.

The primary challenge confronting the process of national construction was the substantial expansion of the empire, which entailed the voluntary or involuntary incorporation of diverse peoples and nationalities into its demographic fabric, resulting in a concurrent diminution of the proportion of Great Russians. According to the data from the 1897 census, a mere 44.3% of the nation's population spoke the language of Great Russia (equivalent to contemporary Russian). When combined with the Little Russians and Belarusians, who spoke dialects distinct from the Russian language, the Russian language (in its traditional sense) became the mother tongue of 66.8% of the population. The figures for adherents of the Russian Orthodox and Old Orthodox faiths in the Empire are similar, at approximately 71 per cent. The proportion of Great Russians was particularly low in the outskirts of the empire. For instance, in 1897, only 6.6% of the population in the Kiev province, 3.8% in Podolsk, and 2.6% in Poltava spoke Great Russian as their mother tongue. The Little Russians primarily resided in the western outskirts of the Russian Empire, collectively known as Little Russia, and in the southern regions, termed Novorossiia. In a significant number of instances, these territories were collectively designated as the Outskirts or Ukraine in the Maloros dialect (E. K. Bystritsky, *Ukraine - Russia: Cultural Distinction*, in: *Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue, National Interests of Ukraine and Russia: Coincidences and Differences*. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, Kyiv, 9 November 1996, pp. 42-48).

The Little Russians were a part of the Russian people that had been subject to Poland for several hundred years and were strongly influenced by Catholicism, Polish secular culture and the Polish language. The autocracy prevented the spread of the Catholic and Greek-Catholic faiths, the establishment of Ukrainian schools, libraries, theatres, the publication of newspapers, magazines and books in the Ukrainian language, i.e. limited the development of the Little Russian people. Two ethnogenetic processes took place among the Little Russians: The inhabitants of the eastern and southern regions of the foothills, the city dwellers, were actively Russified, the inhabitants of the western regions of the foothills, the peasants, were gradually transformed into an independent Ukrainian people. (Kakurin N. E., Vatsetis I. I. *Civil war. 1918-1921*)

Following the census 20 years later, the demographic profile of the Great Russians within the empire underwent further transformation, characterised by a decline in their relative share due to lower natural growth rates when compared with ethnic minorities. This decline was further compounded by substantial losses experienced during the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, resulting in a shift in the ethnic composition of the empire. The demographic shift towards minority status was evident not only in peripheral regions but also within the Russian Empire as a whole. The emergence of a rift within the ruling imperial elite further compounded the ethnic challenges faced by the empire. The emergent bourgeoisie, seeking to augment its own power, engaged in a protracted struggle with the nobility and bureaucracy, who represented the interests of the ruling elite. In this process, the bourgeoisie adroitly exploited the discontent of both the working class and ethnic minorities.

The collection comprises materials from the international scientific conference 'Soviet Nations and National Politics in the 1920s-1950s', which was held in Kiev in October 2013. This conference, the sixth in the series 'History of Stalinism', focused on one of the most significant events in urgent historiographical and political problems of modernity. The contemporary geopolitical landscape, characterised by violent conflicts, the dissolution of numerous states along national lines, and inter-ethnic tensions that jeopardise global stability and integrity, serves to underscore the fundamental significance and intricacy of the national question. Concurrently, political praxis and a plethora of scientific studies acknowledge that national contradictions and ethnic conflicts are not solely precipitated by contemporary conditions and events, but are also significantly influenced by historical legacies. This underscores the necessity for a more profound examination of historical experience as a phenomenon. The development of Soviet nations and the evolution of their national policies during the 1920s and

1950s constitute a pivotal aspect of this endeavour. The conference, which was attended by experts hailing from Russia, Germany, Ukraine, the USA, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Lithuania, and Estonia, as well as France, served as a significant platform for the exchange of ideas and the exploration of new perspectives on this subject. Israel, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Hungary, and Azerbaijan. The publication is intended for researchers and all those interested in the social and political history of Russia. (Bogaturov A.D., Lebedeva O.V., Bobrov A.K. Russia's new generation of foreign policy doctrines // International life. 2022. Issue 6. pages 8-19)

Following eight years of strategic planning, on 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine (Putin, 2022). This action was part of a comprehensive indirect strategy involving special operations, paramilitaries, and the covert involvement of the Russian armed forces, as well as information, psychological, and cyber operations (Putin, 2022). These actions indicate that Vladimir Putin had planned the invasion in advance (Putin, 2022). Whether impulsive or premeditated, this initiative must be analysed within its context (Putin, 2022). The Russian military and political elites, and the Kremlin's perception of the West, have been identified as key factors in prompting extreme measures. Notably, the Palace of the Champs Elysees has characterised this logic as 'paranoia', a term not often used in Russian strategic discourse. In fact, the significance of such acts of force is considered relatively minor in the context of Russian strategic practice. (Metlenko E.A., The 'Gas' conflict between Russia and Ukraine: The experience of its settlement in 1992-1999. // Scientific bulletins of Belgorod State University, History. Political Science. Economics. Informatics, Issue 19 (138) / volume 24/2012.

Over the last three decades, there have been substantial changes in Russian strategic thinking, with the theorisation of disengagement from armed conflict to achieve significant political goals becoming the most salient of these changes. This shift can be attributed to a number of factors, including political and economic weakness, observation of US strategy, analysis of the Cold War experience, and consideration of the context of globalisation. In order to facilitate Moscow's expansion of its influence in the international arena without resorting to interstate armed conflict, Russian strategists have introduced or rethought a variety of concepts and tools. These include the use of non-military means (information, economic, diplomatic, political, cybernetic, cultural, etc.) and indirect military means (in particular special and paramilitary forces, show of force and strategic deterrence). For Moscow, this also entailed challenging Washington and the West in a domain (influence, soft power, various disruptive operations) that was a priority for them. The challenge was to address the humiliation resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union: The Russian approach to warfare, unhinged from the use of force, culminated in a triumph that the United States has dubbed 'the greatest victory in the history of mankind.' (Simons G. Digital Communication Disrupting Hegemonic Power in the Global World Jeopolitics // Russia in Global Affairs. 2019. No. 2. P. 108-125.)

Following the initiation of interstate armed conflict with Ukraine by Vladimir Putin, the extensive indirect strategy that had been in place for eight years was brought to a conclusion. However, this initiative does not equate to a strategic break, as it represents an extreme option that Russian military theorists have never completely ruled out, although they have urged its avoidance wherever possible. From this perspective, it appears that Moscow has meticulously planned for a war in Ukraine, at least in the initial phase, by incorporating the theory of armed struggle developed by Vladimir Slipchenko. However, from the onset of the offensive, Russia found itself compelled to re-evaluate the nature of its actions, owing to the challenges that emerged. Consequently, high intensity armed conflict superseded the indirect strategy, which had hitherto been employed without a tangible intersection of the two approaches. The failure of one led to the actualisation of the other. It is challenging to ascertain the precise moment when Vladimir Putin arrived at the radical decision. Various arguments can be advanced to support the thesis of early preparation and impulsive decision-making. This issue is further complicated by the fact that the deployment and demonstration of force are defined by the Russian military as components of the concept of strategic deterrence, aimed at achieving political goals without armed struggle. (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 31 December 2015 N 683 'On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation')

### RUSSIA AND UKRAINE comparison of military power




**TABLE 1.**

*(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Dr Philip Karder)*

**MAP 1.**




## The Map Before the Attack



(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Dr Philip Karder)

## MAP 2.



*(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Dr Philip Karder)*

## **2. Analysing SWOT and socio-economic indicators of relations.**

### Strengths

Access to European countries through the territory of Ukraine General history of the development of the States ("Sister Peoples") Export/import of goods and services Common border.

### Possibilities

The possibility of Ukraine joining the Eurasian Economic Union to unite the countries in military-strategic terms.

### Weaknesses

Exports of gas from Ukrainian territory (transit) Ukraine's state debt for gas to Russian suppliers Political conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

### Threats

The manifestation of nationalism in Ukraine Ukraine's hostile policy towards Russia The socio-economic crisis is turning Ukraine into a hotbed of instability directly on the border with Russia.

The present study explores the threats to Russia-Ukraine relations, which are more numerous than other components. The primary threats are as follows: Ukraine's hostile policy towards Russia, disruption of gas supplies, and Ukraine's unstable economy close to Russia's borders. These factors lead to an exacerbation of the conflict between the two countries. One of the strengths of the relationship is of course the common border. The common border fosters stable trade turnover between the countries, strengthens relations, promotes tourism, facilitates the establishment of trade alliances, and presents the potential for uniting the countries in a strategic plan. However, as previously discussed, the volume of trade has significantly declined due to geopolitical conflicts.

Ukraine has been used as a bargaining chip in this political game, but what was the reason for this and how did it affect the economies of Russia and Ukraine? In order to better understand this, an analysis of the socio-economic indicators of the countries before and after the start of the conflict is necessary. Russia's territory increased after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, while Ukraine's decreased accordingly. It is evident that Russia's acquisition of Crimea has resulted in the attainment of strategic dominance over the Black Sea region, the Crimean shelf, and a prime tourist destination. However, from an economic perspective, the incorporation of new territories has led to a substantial increase in state budget expenditure. The population of both countries remains unchanged following the annexation of Crimea, with Russia's population increasing by 3 million and Ukraine's decreasing accordingly. In 2013, Ukraine's per capita income was \$300 higher than Russia's \$1,117.9, but by 2015, this had fallen significantly to around \$365 in both countries, due to falling oil prices and an increase in the dollar exchange rate. By 2015, the GDP of both Russia and Ukraine had halved. For Ukraine, this decline was largely attributable to the annexation of Crimea, which contributed approximately 15% of the nation's industrial production and represented a substantial proportion for an economically small country. This was further compounded by the



imposition of a trade embargo between the two countries, resulting in declining prices of raw materials, a situation that was also faced by Russia. Consequently, following the Euromaidan protests, economic growth in both Ukraine and Russia experienced a decline or even entered a negative phase. (Yaremchenko L.N. Improving the simplified tax system as a priority direction of Ukraine's fiscal policy // Russian Entrepreneurship. - 2014. - Issue 2 (248). - In. 59-68.)

Prior to the economic confrontation between the two nations, Russia was experiencing moderate inflation, with an annual rate of 6 per cent, while Ukraine's inflation was generally zero and even negative in 2012. However, the Euromaidan crisis led to a substantial shift in the economic landscape, with inflation accelerating significantly in both countries by 2015. Despite this, Russia's public debt has not increased to a considerable extent when compared to Ukraine's. In 2012, Ukraine's public debt to GDP ratio stood at 36.6 per cent, and by 2015 it had escalated to 94.9 per cent, a figure that has been attributed to the numerous crises in Ukraine, as well as the doubling of the dollar exchange rate. Indeed, the country is on the verge of bankruptcy.

TABLE 2.

Analysis of foreign trade relations between Russia and Ukraine with Russia from 2012 to 2 Dec 2015 Let's compile a table consisting of 2 indicators of the foreign trade turnover between Ukraine. Dec. (Manoilov A. V. Institute of Scientific Information of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences)				
Indicators.	2012	2013	2014	2015
Ukraine's Outside with Russia trade turnover	\$45 billion	\$39.6 billion	\$27.9 billion	\$15 billion
From Russia To Ukraine export	27.29 billion dollar	23.8 milayar dollar	\$18.1 billion	\$9.3 billion
Export to Ukraine-RF	\$17.6 billion	\$15 billion	\$9.1 billion	\$3.55 billion

(Usova L.S., *Ukraine's foreign policy: Between non-alignment and Euro-Atlantic integration* // "Power", No. 7, 2011 and Aliev A.T., *Urumova F.M. Challenges, problems and risks of the formation of the modern Russian economy Bulletin of Leningrad University. AS. Pushkin.* - 2012. - T. 6. - Issue. 3. - S. 183-190.)

Summarising the analysis of socio-economic indicators of Russia and Ukraine, we can say that the conflict has negatively affected the economic and social components not only of Ukraine but also of Russia. However, the Ukrainian economy has had a harder time, because before the conflict Russia was actually its main trading partner and also a gas supplier. In the table above we can see the decline in foreign trade relations between Russia and Ukraine.

When we examine the data in Table 2, it is clear how much the foreign trade turnover between Russia and Ukraine has Decelerated we can see it. foreign trade turnover, which was 45 billion dollars in 2012, reached 15 billion dollars in 2015. Commercial this sharp Decadence in relations is caused by power changes, sanctions and hostile policies between Ukraine and Russia it stems from. Let's look at exactly what goods countries provide to each other. (Manoilov A. V.

TABLE 3.

2. SWOT analysis of Russia and Ukraine: strengths and weaknesses, threats and opportunities	
Strengths	Possibilities
Access to European countries through the territory of Ukraine The 1 general history of the development of states ("Brotherly Peoples") export/import of services is the common border.	Uniting the countries from a military -strategic point of view of Ukraine The possibility of joining the Eurasian Economic Union.
Weaknesses	Threats
Gas exports from the territory of Ukraine (transit) to Russian of Ukraine government debt to suppliers for gas Decoupled between Russia and Ukraine political conflict. (Panyukova V.V. The main indicators of trade development evaluation of. 2014 Results // Trade and Economics Magazine. - 2015. - Volume 2. - Number 1. - s. 7-18. )	Manifestation of nationalism in Ukraine to Russia of Ukraine hostile policy towards socio-economic crisis, Ukraine directly into a hotbed of instability on the Russian border it transforms. The issue is a strong solution to the contradictions of the state 1 to be found; interruption of gas supply to EU countries.

*E. K. Bystritsky. Ukraine - Russia: cultural distinction // Ukraine-Russia dialogue, national interests of Ukraine and Russia: coincidences and differences. Proceedings of the international scientific conference. - K., 1996. - 9 November. - pages 42-48 92)*

**3. To examine the Russian-Ukrainian war and the responsibility of businesses on this issue and to analyse the side effects of the war on tourism.**

Since the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion, more and more Ukrainian and international businesses have been supporting Ukraine's military and civilian population. For example, the "Business in Wartime" survey conducted by members of the European Business Association showed that 61 per cent of the top managers surveyed support their own employees joining the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and 56 per cent help the military and the population financially. Communicating corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects in wartime is part of your organisation's communication ecosystem. If at the beginning of a large-scale invasion companies were involved in providing aid in a chaotic way because everything was needed everywhere, now such activities have taken on a planned character. At the same time for many companies it has become one of the strategic vectors of business activity. (Akhnovska I.O. *The mechanism of implementing corporate social responsibility in enterprises Ukraine* / I.O. Akhnovska, O.Yu. Lepikhova // *Economy and management organisation*. - 2016. - No.1 (21). - s. 3644.)

From a strategic approach, maximum impact can be achieved through projects whose values are synchronised with the values of the business and society. For example, if the main activity of your business is transport, it would be the right decision to provide support in this direction. This approach is demonstrated by many businesses, including Uber.

Together with the Ministry of Health, the company provided promotional codes for free trips to healthcare workers, blood donors, local authorities and public organisations throughout Ukraine. This shows that a wellthought-out idea that intersects with the professional competences of an organisation will always find support among the target audience. CSR projects should be planned like any other communication campaign. Notifications about the volume and scale of CSR projects should be related to the volume of investments in aid. So the more you do, the more often and loudly you should talk about it. In order not to turn the story about good deeds into a reputational crisis, take into account the specific perception of business by different target audiences in Ukraine and reputational risks (Bobko L. O. *Current situation and prospects for the development of corporate social responsibility Ukraine* / L. O. Bobko // *Effectiveness of state management*. - 2016. - Issue 1 (2). - P.41-47; and Grishnova O. A. *Social innovations in the labour sphere: Essence, types, features of implementation in Ukraine* )

Your tools in the planning phase are an action plan and a message box, which will succinctly define the implementation phases and key messages. As for the latter, the emphasis should be on what has already been done: an effective balance of messages - 80 to 20 per cent, where a large component relates to what has been implemented and a smaller component to what is "planned".

Internal, concentrated in the ecosystem of your business; external: media, government, potential customers, partners and employees. Internal stakeholders are the first people who need to know about your projects. Employees are the carriers of corporate reputation. They are also often directly involved in projects.

Everyone will benefit from this approach; both the company, which will strengthen its employer brand, and the employees, who will help to increase the level of non-material motivation with shared values.

The second focus is externally orientated. Even in the strategizing stages, specify why, what, with whom and how often you want to talk about the project. Then, after assessing material and human resources, it is necessary to implement what you have planned.

The lion's share of the projects involves interaction with government agencies and charities and establishing a systematic dialogue. Here it makes sense for businesses to participate in round tables, engage in discussions and sometimes legislate. Or go further and initiate such processes and invite the state to participate.

"Wartime CSR" is becoming one of today's everyday formats, so classic communication approaches are suitable for such projects. But they have their own characteristics. Even if you spend millions on aid, it may still not be a ticket to the pages of publications in the ranking. Either we will have to finance media shows, or we will have to look for formats that are not open for the media.

Always use interviews and public presentations of company speakers as an opportunity to remember the initiative. This topic should not be the focal point, but should become an important part of business communication if it is appropriate and organic.

**Social responsibility** The responsibility of an enterprise is first and foremost the responsibility of the business owners. Much depends on them enough. First of all, the hired staff. During a military offensive people are in great uncertainty. Many businesses are frozen, closed. And the first step of Responsibility is to maintain at least the minimum wage, to preserve jobs. And this is not the decision of the top management, how much the owner. The second point is the understanding that this is our common struggle (Grishnova O. A. *Social innovations in the labour sphere: Essence, types, features of implementation in Ukraine and Ivanova E., Gas industry // Kommersant Power magazine,*)

The global economy and tourism industry have begun to demonstrate signs of recovery following the impact of the pandemic. In 2021, there was an improvement in the number of international tourist arrivals, tourism export earnings and tourism's direct contribution to GDP compared to 2020 (see Table 1). However, the ongoing military offensive by the Russian Federation in Ukraine poses new challenges for the global economic environment. The war has had a negative impact on the tourism sector as well as the world economy. The long-term implications of airspace restrictions, general inflation and rising oil prices may be reflected in ticket prices, thereby hindering the recovery of international travel (UNWTO, 2023). According to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 40% of international tourism trips are made by airplane, 45% by car, and 15% by train, bus and ship (UNWTO, 2023). The Ukraine-Russia war has led to a surge in fuel costs, exerting an upward pressure on the cost of travel for all modes of transport and placing additional pressure on the world tourism sector, which was already experiencing a period of recovery.

TABLE 4.

	2019	2020	2021
Number of international tourist arrivals (overnight visitors)	1.5 billion	0.4 billion	0.42 billion
Export revenues from international tourism (international tourism revenues + passenger transportation)	\$1.7 trillion	\$0.64 trillion	\$0.7-0.8 trillion
Tourism direct contribution to GDP	\$3.5 trillion	\$1.6 trillion	\$1.9 trillion

Source: World Tourism Organization.

This has affected travel within Europe. It has also led to detours on long-haul flights between Europe and East Asia, resulting in longer flights and higher costs (UNWTO,

2022). According to the latest report by the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), Russia and Ukraine will account for 3% of global international tourism expenditure in 2020. In addition, the UNWTO estimates that at least USD 14 billion in global tourism receipts could be lost if the conflict continues.

The importance of both markets is significant both for neighbouring countries and for European sun and sea destinations. Russians have made up a growing proportion of tourists to many European, Asian and Middle Eastern countries in recent decades, and some Mediterranean resorts base their economies on visitors from this country.

In the short term, countries that rely on visitors from Russia and Ukraine will be affected, as travel from both countries will be restricted (Koch, 2022). The global economy and tourism industry have begun to show signs of recovery following the impact of the pandemic. In 2021, the number of international tourist arrivals, tourism export earnings and the direct contribution of tourism to GDP improved compared to 2020 (see Table 1). However, the ongoing military offensive by the Russian Federation in Ukraine poses new challenges to the global economic environment. The long-term effects of airspace restrictions, general inflation and rising oil prices may be reflected in ticket prices, thereby hindering the recovery of international travel (UNWTO, 2023). According to the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), 40% of international tourism trips are made by air, 45% by car and 35% by sea.

The World Tourism Organization (WTO) anticipates a decline in global tourism receipts amounting to 14 billion dollars in the event of a protracted military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. European tourism is particularly vulnerable, and the threat extends beyond Eastern Europe, where the war is currently unfolding, to encompass the entire continent. The prevailing concern pertains to the issue of security, as the ongoing Russian armed aggression has prompted a re-evaluation of travel plans by tourists, particularly those from other continents, regarding the safety of visiting Europe. Consequently, there has been an increasing trend of opting for safer alternatives.

It is reasonable to conclude that all international logistics routes passing through the territory of Ukraine have now ceased to function; however, the Ukrainian market is not the only one that has suffered from this war. According to data published on its WTO website by Eurocontrol, certain European destinations witnessed a decline in the number of flights after 24 February, compared to the same period in 2021. For instance, there was a 69 per cent decrease in flights to Moldova, a 42 per cent decrease to Slovenia, a 38 per cent decrease to Latvia, and a 36 per cent decrease to Finland.

The tourism sector is also adversely affected by terrorism, which can occur regardless of the duration of the war. The deliberate organisation of terrorist attacks is intended to project an image of human casualties and to influence tourists' fear of such high-pressure places. A substantial corpus of research has been dedicated to the documentation of the detrimental impacts of terrorism on tourism. Prominent scholars, including Fleischer and Buccola (2002), Buigut et al. (2017) and Poprawe (2015), have contributed to this field of enquiry. However, it should be noted that the impact of terrorism on tourism is not invariably negative in the long term (Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty 2009; Yaya 2009).

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the ramifications of the Russian-Ukrainian war on tourist trips from Russia and Ukraine, and its repercussions on conventional tourist destinations. The article goes on to discuss the threats to business, the economy and the tourism sector as well as the opportunities on the horizon. The European Union's decision to impose a visa ban on Russian citizens, a measure enacted in response to the Russian attacks on Ukraine, is likely to have a negative impact on the tourism sector.

Georgia, with approximately 1.5 million Russian migrants, and Kazakhstan, with 300,000 Russian migrants, have become a focal point for anti-war Russians. See: Georgia has emerged as a significant nexus for anti-war Russians. By Giorgi Bolkvadze, 18 February 2023. Online: <https://www.euronews.com/2023/02/18/georgia-becomes-a-hub-for-anti-war-russians>; Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. About 200,000 Foreigners Apply For Kazakh ID Numbers Amid Influx Of Russian Nationals. By RFE/RL's KazakhService. October 26, 2022. Online: <https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-russians-id-numbers-ukrainemobilization/32101506.html>

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has argued that the war will have four main consequences for Europe's tourism industry. Firstly, there will be a loss of Russian and Ukrainian tourists. Secondly, there will be restrictions on the use of airspace and airlines. Thirdly, higher costs are expected in relation to food and fuel. Finally, there will be a significant drop in travellers' confidence and disposable income.

The repercussions for the European tourism sector will be multifaceted and will include Russian and Ukrainian tourists leaving the country; restrictions on airlines and airspace usage; increased food and fuel expenditures; and a significant reduction in travellers' confidence and disposable incomes.



Given that many Russian tourists are unable to travel abroad, it is estimated that they will instead holiday in their home country. A notable increase in bookings has been observed among tour operators, particularly for traditional destinations such as river cruises along the Volga and sanatoriums located on the Black Sea coast of Sochi.

## 2. Literature Review.

This article systematically explicates the intertwined relationship between war and tourism in constructing narratives during the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war.

The relationship between war and tourism is complex. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that war has a substantial adverse impact on the tourism industry, which can be expected to experience a decline in revenues and tourist arrivals (Reddy et al., 2020; Selvanathan, 2007). Furthermore, the tourism market can be expected to be subject to disruption (Balli et al., 2023; Corbet et al., 2023), and tourism businesses can be expected to experience significant operational pressure (Tomej et al., 2023). Of particular note is the finding that the impact of war can be so profound as to cause the permanent deterioration of once popular tourism destinations into zones of violence and instability (Mansfeld, 1999). However, it should be noted that warfare can also result in the emergence of novel growth opportunities for the tourism industry, as evidenced by the propensity of tourists to visit areas that are not afflicted by conflict (Butler & Suntikul, 2013).

In addition to the impact of war on tourism, extant literature on tourism has identified the pivotal function of tourism in facilitating economic recovery and cultural reconciliation in war-affected regions. The dynamics, locations and historical and social impacts of war can be attractive to tourists (Bigley et al., 2010; Henderson, 2000), providing destinations with the opportunity to offer war-related tourism such as war tourism (Williams et al., 2023) and dark tourism destinations (Miles, 2014). In the aftermath of war, tourism is regarded by political entities as a novel source of revenue for the country or region in question (Butler & Suntikul, 2017; Mirisae & Ahmad, 2018). Moreover, tourism can be employed as a strategic instrument to foster cooperation and the establishment of trust between regions that are hostile or divided (Ioannides & Apostolopoulos, 1999; Pizam et al., 2002). Consequently, this can encourage more extensive social reconciliation.

The intricacies of warfare frequently exceed the general public's comprehension capacity, with news media serving as the predominant conduit through which the public acquires information regarding these complex events. News articles are not merely a record of events as they happen; they also reflect the perspectives of various stakeholders, thereby creating a rich tapestry of the social and political climate surrounding events (Schmidt et al., 2013). Furthermore, news media have been found to play a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions by highlighting issues of importance (Severin & Tankard, 1997), providing guidance on relevant considerations (Cohen, 2015), and establishing the agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). In light of this influence, tourism researchers have identified news media as a vital source of information that can provide invaluable insights into emerging phenomena such as the sharing economy (Cheng, 2016) and the COVID-19 pandemic (Chen et al., 2022). Consequently, a thorough examination of media discourse offers profound insights into the intricate and interdependent relationships between war and tourism.

TABLE 5.

Research theme	Representative studies
The impact of war on tourism destination	<a href="#">Fernando et al. (2013)</a> , <a href="#">Hamadeh and Bassil (2017)</a> , <a href="#">Ioannides and Apostolopoulos (1999)</a> , <a href="#">Y. Lee (2006)</a> , <a href="#">Nazli (2023)</a>
The impact of war on tourism businesses	<a href="#">Balli et al. (2023)</a> , <a href="#">Corbet et al. (2023)</a> , <a href="#">Josiassen et al. (2023)</a> , <a href="#">Nicolau et al. (2024)</a> , <a href="#">Tomej et al. (2023)</a>



*Studies on War and Tourism.*

### **3. Methods and Materials.**

The present study utilised qualitative data, encompassing textual, visual, and auditory elements, to explore the phenomenon under investigation. A comprehensive selection of sources was undertaken, encompassing databases, archives, websites, and meticulous literature reviews. The selection of sources was based on a set of criteria, including the coverage of a specific topic or time period, the reliability of the sources, such as academic journals, official institutions, and peer-reviewed publications, the legal and practical accessibility of the sources, and, most importantly, their contemporary relevance or reflection of a specific period.

A range of methodologies were employed in the analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war, encompassing content analysis, negotiations, and detailed case studies. The content of the research included media information, official documents and academic articles. The methodology employed in this study entailed a systematic examination of the media and propaganda, with the objective of ascertaining the public perception of the war and the methods employed to influence public opinion. The methodology of this research involved historical studies, thorough investigation of the causes of the war, and analysis of similar conflicts.

The materials related to the research, news, comments and analyses about the war, important media reports that shape public perception were examined, official documents, those published by the government and international organisations, and information from individuals critical to understanding the legal and political dimensions of the war. Furthermore, previous academic articles on the Russian-Ukrainian war were consulted, providing academic studies, theoretical frameworks and analyses on this topic.

### **Conclusion**

Today, relations between Russia and Ukraine are not at the desired level. The deterioration of the economic development of both countries, a 3-fold decrease in foreign trade turnover, an increase in inflation rates and unemployment - all these are the consequences of the regional conflict. Judging from the current situation, we can say that the work on the settlement of the conflict between the countries has not yet progressed. The authorities of Ukraine and European countries continue to support trade sanctions against Russia, and Ukraine remains indebted to Russia for gas, which naturally exacerbates the situation. An extremely unpleasant consequence for Russia is that its global image is seriously damaged, the information war is in a sense lost. To resolve this situation, friendly actions by both countries are necessary. Such as payment of gas debt, lifting of sanctions, negotiations on the settlement of the dispute and other measures. Countries need to remember that the state is first and foremost a people, and the general population suffers because of political intrigues and the division of spheres of influence. The phrase "brotherly peoples" should not be an empty phrase, but should express a strong unity of countries.

A large-scale war accelerates many processes, not least the approach of Ukrainian business to the standards of the civilised world. In Ukraine, as in the US and Europe, it is no longer possible to make money without having a positive impact on society. If an enterprise does not care about its employees, if it does not engage in initiatives that are important for society, if it does not bring our victory closer with actions, then there will be no place for it in Ukraine after the victory. Because social responsibility is not a duty or an additional burden, it is the basis of business in the civilised world.

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war has had a detrimental effect on the tourism sector. The ongoing conflict has exerted a deleterious effect on the tourism sector, with a decline observed in the number of tourists from both the Russian and Ukrainian markets.

The Russia-Ukraine war has had a significantly detrimental effect on the Russian economy. The war has precipitated a range of economic challenges, including the depreciation of the ruble, elevated inflation, and the imposition of international sanctions, which have had deleterious effects on Russia's trade and energy supply.

In contemporary times, a significant word is being repeatedly articulated by hundreds of millions of individuals across the globe. The word is characterised by a sense of urgency, aspiration, and earnest aspirations. This word is "peace". This term is imbued with profound significance. Sulh embodies the concepts of vigour, fidelity, creation, and social, economic, and economic development. However, it is a matter of concern that the full safety of the individual is not yet guaranteed. Across various regions, armed conflicts persist, resulting in substantial loss of life, including that of innocent children and youth. The fundamental concept of human beings desiring and craving all kinds of misfortunes is a concept that is often disregarded. In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the 21st of January as the United Nations Day of Peace, a resolution that was endorsed by all member states. In 2001, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing the establishment of a global day of ceasefire.

In light of the 'devastating consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War', the 'weakness of the international system in the face of this conflict', and the 'critical importance of achieving peace', the necessity of international efforts to definitively resolve the conflict and promote peace is emphasised. The conclusion section provides a comprehensive overview of the concept of 'peace' and the importance of UN Peace Day. The purpose of this analysis is to elucidate the significance of these concepts, as articulated in the primary conclusions of the article. For instance, the resulting consequences, such as the 'human cost of war', 'economic destruction' and 'regional instability', have not been taken into account in the efforts of both countries to achieve lasting peace. As the article progresses, the argument is made that the overarching objective of the subjects analysed, including 'diplomatic efforts', 'the role of international law' and 'civil society's calls for peace', is also 'peace'.

As previously mentioned in the article, the role of the UN Peace Day and the UN, along with other international organisations, in the war is discussed under the headings of 'the UN's humanitarian aid efforts' and 'Security Council resolutions and international efforts.' The objective of this initiative is twofold: firstly, to reinforce the UN's overarching mission of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and secondly, to underscore the capacity of such events to elevate global awareness.

The conclusion will be structured around a discussion of hopes for the cessation of hostilities and the international community's responsibilities in achieving peace. The objective can be achieved by providing a brief summary of possible scenarios for peace or obstacles to peace that could address the issues analysed in the article.

It is to be hoped that the Russia-Ukraine war will also be brought to a conclusion with the implementation of a peace treaty in the near future. The resolution of this conflict would undoubtedly result in the revitalisation of the economies, prosperity and tourism of both countries and the restoration of safe passage for individuals to travel to other countries. It is widely acknowledged that peace is an integral component of the development of any nation.

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